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THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISION OF
SARBANES-OXLEY: DISCERNING THE SCOPE
OF "PROTECTED ACTIVITY"
By: Robert P. Riordan & Leslie E. Wood, Alston & Bird LLP*

I. INTRODUCTION

In response to Enron and numerous other corporate business
scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX"), to
combat fraudulent accounting practices and other conduct defrauding
shareholders. The stated purpose of SOX is "to protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws," and SOX mandates corporate
responsibility, public disclosure, and improved methods of auditing and
financial reporting to effectuate this goal.2
This article focuses on section 806 of SOX, the "whistleblower
provision," which protects employees of publicly traded companies from
retaliation for bringing certain perceived corporate wrongdoings to light,
thereby encouraging disclosure of such information and serving SOX's
overarching goal of protecting shareholder assets. Specifically, this
article attempts to analyze the trends that are emerging as courts and
administrative tribunals consider what types of employee actions
constitute activities protected under section 806 and seeks to discern the
boundaries of what constitutes protected activity under current law. In
performing this exercise, the ultimate goal is to arm employers with the
information necessary to avoid potential whistleblower claims under
Sarbanes-Oxley in the future, and to discourage unfounded claims that
can cause substantial harm despite the absence of legal merit.

. Robert P. Riordan is a partner at the Atlanta, Georgia, based law firm of Alston & Bird LLP and
the leader of its Labor & Employment Practice Group. Leslie E. Wood is an associate in the group
and joined the firm recently following a clerkship in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
2.

Id. at 745.
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II. SECTION 806-NUTS AND BOLTS
Section 806 prohibits covered employers from dismissing or
discriminating against an employee who files, causes to be filed,
testifies, participates in, provides information, or assists in an
investigation regarding employer conduct that the employee reasonably
believes constitutes a violation of (1) mail, bank, wire, or securities law;
(2) any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"); or (3) any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders. To qualify as an employer, the company must be publicly
traded.4 That is, the prohibition of section 806 only applies to
companies that either hold a class of securities registered under section
12 or are required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as well as "any officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent of such company. '' 5 If a plaintiff can
successfully mount a whistleblower claim, both civil and criminal
penalties may be sought.6
An employee wishing to initiate a civil enforcement action under
section 806 must file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within
ninety days of the alleged violation.7 The Secretary has designated the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") as the agency
responsible for initially investigating the complaints, and thus OSHA
performs any necessary investigation and works to issue written findings
within sixty days of the complaint being filed.8 Either party can file
objections to the written findings and request a de novo hearing with an
Administrative Law Judge ("AL"). 9 After the ALJ renders a decision,
the parties can seek review by the Administrative Review Board
("ARB"). 10 If still unsatisfied, a party can file a petition for review with
the United States Court of Appeals. 1 While this is the normal course of

3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2006).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).
5. Id.
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(b), 1513(e); see also John F. Fatino, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002
and the New Prohibition on Employer RetaliationAgainst Whistleblowers: For Whom the Bell Tolls
or Tooting One's Own Horn?, 51 S.D. L. REv. 450, 450-54 (2006) (discussing the Act's civil and
criminal remedies).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
8. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.104-.105 (2005); Delegation of Authority and Assignment of
Responsibility to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, 67 Fed. Reg. 65008
(Dep't of Labor Oct. 22, 2002).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.106 (2005).
10. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.109-.110 (2005).
11. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.112 (2005).
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complaints under section 806, a complainant can obtain de novo review
of his claim in federal district court if the Secretary fails to issue a final
decision within 180 days of the filing of the complaint and there is no
showing that the delay is due to the complainant's bad faith.'"
Whether the employee's civil enforcement claim is heard through
the administrative channel or by a district court under the 180-day rule,
the elements of proof are the same. The plaintiff must make a prima
facie case by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1)
the employee engaged in protected activity as defined by SOX; (2) the
employer was aware of the protected activity; (3) the employee suffered
an adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances exist which are
sufficient to raise an inference that the protected activity was likely a
contributing factor in the unfavorable action. 13 Once the employee
meets this burden, he is entitled to relief unless the employer can show
by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same
unfavorable personnel action even in the absence of such protected
activity. 14
III. PROTECTED ACTIVrTY LITIGATION

Although there has been litigation over many aspects of SOX
whistleblower claims, including the 180-day rule, 15 the exhaustion
requirement, 16 the ninety-day time period for filing complaints, 7 and the
"contributing factor" element,' 8 this article zeroes in on litigation over
the question of what exactly constitutes a protected activity.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to glean any bright-line rule from the
existing decisional authority. Nonetheless, guiding principles are
developing, and construing "protected activity" narrowly, and thus
favorably to employers, certainly seems to be the current trend.
a. The Basics
While there is clearly some uncertainty as to the scope of protected
activity under section 806 of SOX, the statute itself sets forth the basic

12.

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b) (Supp. 2006).

13.

Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1375-76 (N.D. Ga. 2004).

14. Id. at 1376.
15. See, e.g., Murray v. TXU Corp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 799, 802 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
16. See, e.g., Zhu v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Bd., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1272 (D. Kan. 2005).
17. See, e.g., Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., 2005 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS 98, at *5, ARB
No. 04-120, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-00054 (ARB Aug. 31, 2005).
18. See, e.g., Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2dat 1376.
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definition of what employee actions will be covered. Section 806
protects an employee who provides information that the employee
"reasonably believes constitutes a violation" of the enumerated laws to
(1) a federal law enforcement agency or regulatory agency, (2) 'a
committee or member of Congress, (3) a person with supervisory
authority over the employee, or (4) a person working for the employer9
who has the authority to investigate, discover, or terminate misconduct.'
This definition has been further expounded in both administrative and
federal court decisions.2 °
The ARB elaborated on what qualifies as "providing information"
in the context of determining whether an employee's conduct is a
protected activity in Getman v. Southwest Securities, Inc. 21 In Getman, a
stock analyst for a broker-dealer/investment adviser claimed that she
engaged in a protected activity when she refused to raise a stock rating
under pressure from her employer's Review Committee.2 2 Reversing the
AL, the ARB held that the refusal to change a rating did not, by itself,
constitute a protected activity.23 In so holding, the ARB explained that
"[i]n drafting whistleblower protection laws, Congress... has drawn the
distinction between notifying the employer of a violation and refusing to
commit a violation., 24 The ARB explained that to qualify as a protected
activity, an employee must actually communicate a concern that the
employer's conduct constitutes one of the enumerated violations. 25 The

19. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (Supp. 2006).
20. Jeffrey S.Klein and Nicholas J. Pappas, Defining 'Whistleblower' Under the SarbanesOxley Act, N.Y.L.J. Aug. 7, 2006 at 3 (discussing Fraser v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d
May
310 (S.D.N.Y 2006) and Bishop v. PCS Admin., No. 5 C. 5683, 2006 WL 1460032 (N.D. 11.
23, 2006)).
21. ARB Case No. 04-059, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 18 (Dep't of Labor July 29, 2005).
22. Id. at *9-10.
23. Id. at *19.
24. Id. at'*18 -19.
25. Id. at *18. In the recent decision ofPlatone v. FL YI,Inc., 2006 DOL Ad. Rev. Bd. LEXIS
89, ARB No. 04-154, ALJ No. 2003-SOX-27 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006), the ARB again analyzed the
communication aspect of SOX whistleblower claims. The ARB explained the principle that "an
employee's protected communications must relate 'definitively and specifically' to the subject
matter of the particular statute under which protection is afforded." Id. at *32. Indeed, the Board
stated that "the relevant inquiry is not what [an employee alleges in her complaint], but what she
actually communicated to her employer ...prior to the termination." Id. at *34. In Platone, the
employee had sent a series of emails and engaged in conversations with her superior and others
addressing a potential billing issue between her company and the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA). Id. at *11-16, *33. The court found that none of these communications "include[d] any
specific revelations about fraudulent activity affecting shareholder interests." Id. at *39. Thus,
contrary to what she alleged in her complaint, she had not informed her superior that the company
had either created or acquiesced in a scheme to funnel improper payments to members of ALPA's
master executive counsel. Id. at *43. Accordingly, there was no protected activity. Id. at *45.
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ARB did note that "[t]here may be times where only refusal is sufficient
to provide information," but found that Getman's refusal did not do S0.26
A more difficult question than what constitutes "provid[ing]
information"--and the key to adequately defining the scope of protected
activity under SOX-is the question of what types of conduct employees
can "reasonably believe[] constitute[]" violations of the enumerated
laws.27 As is clear from the statute and as has been repeatedly
emphasized by ALJs, the ARB, and the courts, "[a]n employee can
engage in §1514A protected activity even if the reported conduct did not
actually constitute a violation of one of the laws or regulations
enumerated" so long as he or she reasonably believed a violation
occurred.28 Thus, we know that an employee's communication can
qualify as a protected activity only if it communicates either (1) an
actual violation of one of the enumerated laws or (2) some other conduct
that one could reasonably believe was a violation of one of the
enumerated laws. 29 Accordingly, the key to gaining an understanding of
the scope of protected activity under section 806 is to familiarize oneself
with the conduct that decision-makers have thus far concluded
is of the
30
type one could "reasonably believe" to be a violation.
b. Beyond the Basics-DecisionsReigning in the Scope of Protected
Activity
As a starting point in analyzing what decision-makers have found
(and will in the future find) to be conduct that one could reasonably
believe to be a violation, it should be noted that Congress "intended to
impose the normal reasonable person standard used and interpreted in a
wide variety of legal contexts.'
Additionally, it is clear that "[t]he

26. Getman, 2005 DOLSOX Lexis 18, at *18.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. 2006).
28. Bishop v. PCS Admin., No. 05 C. 5683, 2006 WL 1460032, at *5 (N.D. I11.May 23,
2006) (citing Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2004)).
29. Id. at *5, *8.
30. While it is necessary for a complainant to have both a subjective and an objective belief
that the reported conduct was a violation, see id. at *5; see also Livingston v. Wyeth Inc., No.
1:03CV00919, 2006 WL 2129794, at *9 (M.D.N.C. July 28, 2006) (noting a whistleblower must
"not only subjectively believe that the reported conduct ... constitute[s] fraud on shareholders," but
that "there must also be a reasonable, objective basis for suspecting such fraud"), as a practical
matter, it is the decisions analyzing the objective-belief requirement that create the boundaries of
what may be considered a protected activity in the future. Accordingly, the objective standard is the
focus of this article.
31. Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d, at 1376 (quoting Legislative History of Title VIII of H.R. 2673:
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Cong. Rec. S7418, S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002), availableat
2002 WL 32054527).
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employee's access to information, experience, and background are
considerations in determining whether he or she had a reasonable
belief." 32 With these considerations in mind, this article will now
consider several recent administrative and district court decisions that
are instructive as to the range of conduct that constitutes a protected
activity.
1. Complaints Over Internal Policy
Several recent cases support the proposition that raising complaints
about internal policy is not protected under SOX. In Bishop v. PCS
Administration (USA), Inc.,33 the plaintiff, who was the former in-house
attorney for PCS Administration, claimed that she was terminated for
notifying her employer that its compliance program was deficient under
sentencing guidelines regarding corporate compliance and ethics and
that this deficiency put the company at risk for liability of future
violations.34 Plaintiff argued that simply "raising the specter of potential
fraud" constituted protected activity, but the district court disagreed.35
The district court explained that the statute's plain language refers to
providing information that is reasonably believed to "constitute a
violation" of one of the enumerated statutes or regulations and that
"[t]he word 'constitute' should be understood to mean an actual
violation has occurred, which could include an attempt (in the criminal
sense)., 36 Thus, "[t]o the extent there is a reasonable (but incorrect)
belief, it must be a reasonable belief that an actual violation has occurred
or is being attempted., 37 The court held that it was not reasonable for
the plaintiff, as an attorney, to believe that simply because the
company's compliance program was legally deficient and an increased
potential and risk of violations or penalties was thus present, an actual
violation had occurred or was being attempted.38
Admittedly, the court clearly considered the fact that the plaintiff
was an attorney when it concluded that her subjective belief was not
objectively reasonable. 39 Thus, practitioners would likely be challenged

32.
33.

Bishop, 2006 WL 1460032, at *5.
2006 WL 1460032 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2006).

34. Id. at *1, *3.
35. Id. at *6.
36. Id. at *8.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. "If the law itself does not establish that a deficient compliance program is a violation
of the pertinent statutes or regulations concerning fraud, then the subjective belief of plaintiff (an
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in an attempt to rely on Bishop in situations where the reporting
employee does not have such specialized knowledge. Nonetheless,
Bishop lends at least some support to the proposition that complaints
regarding deficiencies or noncompliance with purely internal safeguards
will not constitute a protected activity when failure to comply with those
safeguards does not itself violate statutes or regulations relating to fraud
on shareholders (or any other rule or regulation of the SEC).4 ° Other
cases lend support to this proposition as well. In Marshallv. Northrop
Grumman Synoptics,41 the ALI held that complaints about internal
controls being inconsistent with general accounting principles and
complaints that financial records for the internal use of a department
were incorrect could not constitute a protected activity when such errors
did not affect any public report or other document that could be the basis
of actual fraud on shareholders.4 2 The AU explained that "raising a
concern about a violation of an ethics policy is not a protected activity.
The fact that the concerns involved accounting and finances in some
way does not automatically mean or imply that fraud or any other illegal

attorney practicing before the SEC) was not objectively reasonable." Id.
40. A tangential issue that is currently developing is whether reports of innocent violations of
SEC laws constitute protected activity. The Bishop court explained that "[a]ll the statutes and
regulations referenced in § 1514(a)(1) are ones setting forth fraud" and "[tihe phrase 'relating to
fraud against shareholders' in this provision must be read as modifying each item in the series,
including 'rule or regulation' of the [SEC]." Bishop, 2006 WL 1460032, at *9 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
1514A(a)(1) (Supp. 2006)). The majority of decisions are in accord with the proposition that "fraud
is an integral element of a whistleblower cause of action" under SOX. Livingston v. Wyeth Inc.,
No. 1:03CV00919, 2006 WL 2129794, at *9 (M.D.N.C. July 28, 2006); see also Smith v. Hewlett
Packard, No. 2005-SOX-00088, 2006 WL 468045 (Dep't of Labor Jan. 19, 2006) ("The legislative
history of the Act explains that fraud is an essential element of a claim brought under the
whistleblower provision."). However, in the recent case of Klopfenstein v. PCCFlow Technologies
Holdings, Inc., ARB Case No. 04-149, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 59 (Dep't of Labor May 31, 2006),
the ARB suggested that an innocent violation of an SEC rule may give rise to jurisdiction under
SOX if an employee were retaliated against for reporting it. Id. at *35. While it was merely dicta,
the ARB stated that "we do not believe that activity is protected only when ... the complainant
believes he is reporting fraud." Id. The court further noted that "[i]t certainly is possible that [the
complainant] engaged in protected activity" when he reported certain accounting discrepancies even
if he did not believe that the discrepancies amounted to fraud. Id. at *36. This issue is beyond the
scope of this article because it will only be raised in a small number of situations, but it is a
development worth noting and watching in the future. On a related note, and assuming, contrary to
the suggestion in Klopfenstein, that fraud is an essential element of a whistleblower claim under
SOX, the recent district court case of Fraser v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 310, 323
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), held that a report about an employer's conduct can qualify as a protected activity
even if the statement does not expressly indicate that the employer was acting fraudulently as long
as it describes conduct that constitutes fraud. Id.
41. Marshall v. Northrop Grumman Synoptics, No. 2005-SOX-0008, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS
63 (Dep't of Labor June 22, 2005).
42. Id. at *12.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

7

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:95

43

conduct took place.,
Likewise, in Richards v. Lexmark International, Inc.,44 the AU
held that a complaint that the "Days of Inventory" calculation used by
the employer had potential to misrepresent and understate the number of
days that items remained in inventory, which could potentially result in
misrepresentations in management's reports, did not constitute a
protected activity.45 The ALJ explained that it was not reasonable for
the complainant, who had a Masters of Business Administration and
over thirty years of supply chain management experience, to think this
constituted fraud on shareholders.46 This was because there was no
evidence that the methods used were not in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") or contrary to any other SEC
requirements, certified public accountants were involved, and write-offs
were footnoted in the financial statements.4 7 Thus, the court concluded
that "[n]o facts [had] been adduced that would cause a reasonable person
with Complainant's training and experience to determine that there was
any potential securities fraud or violation of any laws or SEC rules and
regulations. "48
Again, like Bishop, the complainant's expertise in Lexmark played
at least some role in the decision. 49 Furthermore, the ALJs in both
Lexmark and Marshall doubted the respective complainant's subjective
belief, 50 which provides another way in which complainants could
distinguish these cases in the future. Nonetheless, it seems that Bishop,
Marshall, and Lexmark, taken together, support the conclusion that
complaints about purely internal reporting matters or internal controls
that do not directly violate a law enumerated in section 806 will not be
deemed protected activity under SOX. 5' This is in line with the notion
that "[p]rotected activity must implicate the substantive law protected in
Sarbanes-Oxley definitively and specifically., 52 However, it is critical
to note that while complaints about purely internal accounting and

43. Id.
44. No. 2004-SOX-00049, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 71 (Dep't of Labor June 20, 2006).
45. Id. at *9 1.
46. See id. at *90, *92.
47. See id. at *42,*91-92.
48. Id. at *92.
49. See id. at *90; Bishop v. PCS Admin., No. 05 C. 5683, 2006 WL 1460032, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
May 23, 2006).
50. See Lexmark, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 71, at *92; Marshall v. Northrop Grumman
Synoptics, No. 2005-SOX-0008, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 63, at *11 (Dep't of Labor June 22, 2005).
51. See Bishop, 2006 WL 1460032, at *6; Marshall, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 63, at *10-11;
Lexmark, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 71, at *92.
52.

Fraser v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 310, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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ethical matters might fall safely outside the scope of protected activity,
such is not the case when the complaint involves noncompliance with
internal accounting controls promulgated in compliance with SarbanesOxley mandates or SEC rules and regulations. In that case, the
noncompliance itself would indeed be a violation of one of the laws
enumerated in section 806."3
2. Complaints that Wrongdoing Would Result in Fraudulent
Misstatement
The following cases differ from Bishop, Lexmark, and Marshall in
that the conduct complained of is more than simply noncompliance with
internal policy.
In these cases, complainants allege that some
wrongdoing by the employer could constitute or eventually lead to
fraudulent misstatements in the financial statements. These decisions
infuse the notion of materiality into the mix of factors to consider when
trying to determine whether conduct is of the type that one could
"reasonably believe"5 4 constitutes a violation of the statutes and
regulations enumerated in section 806. In doing so, these cases serve to
limit the potential range of what constitutes a protected activity.
In the case of Harvey v. Home Depot, Inc.,55 the complainant
brought a claim under section 806 alleging that he was retaliated against
for reporting racial discrimination and additional behavior that reflected
an overall bias, prejudice, and abuse of power by the company
executives. 56 The ALI explained that the complainant engaged in a
protected activity only if the conduct he complained of could
"reasonably be considered to fall within the six SOX specified categories
of protected activities. 5 7 Because none of the complainant's allegations
related to mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, or any
violation of SEC rules, the case turned on whether the complainant
reported something that could reasonably be believed to constitute
a
58
shareholders.
against
fraud
to
relating
law
federal
of
violation
The ALJ noted that "an implicit argument may be made that a
company which permits discriminatory practices despite its public policy
53.

See, e.g., Morefield v. Exelon Servs., Inc., No. 2004-SOX-00002, 2004 WL 3567255, at

*3, *4 (Dep't of Labor Jan. 28, 2004); Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365,
1377 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
54. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a)(1) (Supp. 2006).
55. No. 2004-SOX-20, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 56 (Dep't of Labor May 28, 2004).
56. Id. at *5-7, *15.
57. Id. at *35.
58. See id. at *35-36.
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of equal opportunity is acting contrary to the best interests of its share
holders," but explained that this argument fails because a protected
activity under SOX "must involve an alleged violation of a federal law
directly related to fraud against share holders."59 "[T]he federal law
actually prohibiting individual employment discriminatory practices,
Title VII, is based on individual rights and establishes procedures to
address illegal employment discrimination; it was not enacted to
preclude fraud against shareholders." 60 The ALJ went on to consider the
argument that because "SOX mandates the accuracy of corporate
disclosures, a reported incident of racial discrimination within a publicly
traded company that represents itself to be non-discriminatory may
amount to a violation of a SOX disclosure requirement and thus involve
a federal law related to fraud against shareholders.", 61 The ALJ
concluded that despite the logical appeal of this argument, the link
between the discrimination at issue and SOX was too tenuous. 6' The
provisions of SOX requiring accuracy of corporate disclosures reflect
Congress' intent to protect shareholders by requiring accurate reporting
of a corporation's financial condition.63 Whether an employer's acts of
individual discrimination comply with the company's stated equal
opportunity standards has a very marginal connection to accurate
accounting and financial condition. 64 Accordingly, the ALJ found that
the complainant's report did not constitute a protected activity. 65 The
ALI left a door open, however, when he noted that the reporting of an
employer's "failure to disclose a class action lawsuit based on systemic
racial discrimination with the potential to sufficiently affect the financial
condition of a corporation might [constitute] SOX protected activity
if
66
an individual complained about the failure to disclose that situation.,
involving the same
The case of Harvey v. Safeway, Inc.,
complainant and ALJ as the Home Depot case, reiterates the principles
established in Home Depot 68 and applies them in a slightly different
context. In Safeway, the complainant alleged that his complaints of
wage violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at *37-38.
Id. at *38.
Id. at *38-39.
Id. at *39.
See id.
See id.
Id. at *43.
Id. at *39-40.
No, 2004-SOX-21, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 4 (Dep't of Labor Feb. 11, 2005).
See supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
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constituted a protected activity under section 806.69 The ALJ explained
that complaints of systemic violations of FLSA could potentially "reach
the necessary magnitude to effectively perpetrate a fraud on
shareholders," but ultimately held that the complainant's reports of
discrepancies in his weekly paychecks did not fall within this category
and thus did not constitute a protected activity.70 In reaching this
conclusion, the ALJ noted that FLSA is focused on ernployee
compensation and not the prevention of fraud against shareholders. 7 1
The ALJ reasoned that while it could be argued that the employer's
"under-compensation of its employees could impermissibly alter the
accuracy of its financial disclosures mandated by SOX," the connection
between an individual FLSA violation and SOX is too tenuous.72 The
ALJ explained that even if uncorrected, the underpayment of the
complainant's wages would have only a "microscopic" effect on any
financial report prepared by the employer for the benefit of the
shareholders.73 The AU concluded that the complainant's reports
simply failed to reach "the requisite level of materiality. ' 74 To tie his
ultimate decision in with the objective reasonableness standard, the ALJ
simply stated that the complainant's report "did not include an
objectively reasonable complaint that [the employer] was also engaged
in a significant, material and company-wide underpayment of its
employees to the extent a fraud was being perpetrated on its
shareholders. 75
Thus, from Home Depot and Safeway, we see that materiality is the
key to a successful whistleblower complaint when the claimed protected
activity is a report of some wrongdoing that is not closely linked with
76
Stated another way, "a complainant
shareholder communications.
could only reasonably believe that perceived conduct was a fraudulent
misstatement of corporate financial condition if that conduct was
material toward the representation of that condition."77 The case of
Minkina v. Affiliated Physician's Group is consistent with this

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See Safeway, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS 4, at *1-2, *4.
Id. at *78.
Id. at*79.
Id. at *80.
Id. at *80-81.
Id. at *80.
Id. at *83.

76. Id. at *80; Harvey v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-20, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 56, at
*42 (Dep't of Labor May 28, 2004).
77. Tice v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 2006-SOX-20, 2006 WL 2616393, at *18 (Dep't of
Labor Apr. 26, 2006).
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proposition. 78 In Minkina, the complainant alleged that she was
retaliated against for reports she made to OSHA as well as her employer
concerning what she believed to be dangerous air quality conditions at
the workplace. 79 The ALJ held that the complainant's reports did not
constitute protected activity. 80 The AU explained that:
Quite simply, while the Complainant may have had a valid claim of
poor air quality, Sarbanes-Oxley . . . was enacted to address the

specific problem of fraud in the realm of publicly traded companies
and not the resolution of air quality issues, even if there is a8ossibility
that poor air quality might ultimately result in financial loss.
Admittedly, the AU in Minkina ends his analysis without
discussion of materiality.82 However, the conclusion is consistent with
the rule that can be gleaned from Home Depot and Safeway-reports of
violations of laws or regulations unrelated to shareholder fraud will not
be deemed protected activity unless the effect of such would be material
to a shareholder. 83 Minkina may very well have had a different result if
the evidence showed that the conduct complained of did indeed
constitute an environmental violation, the government was stepping in to
impose fines, and those fines would have a material effect on the
financial statements.
The principles developed by Home Depot and Safeway were
recently endorsed-and arguably expanded in a way that is favorable to
employers-by a federal court in Livingston v. Wyeth Inc.84 In
Livingston, the employer company was a developer and manufacturer of
pharmaceutical, consumer health, and animal health products, and was
regulated pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and
regulations thereunder.85
These regulations require current good
manufacturing practices ("GMPs") by all manufacturers of

78. Minkina v. Affiliated Physician's Group, No. 2005-SOX-00019, 2005 DOLSOX LEXIS
41, at *16-17 (Dep't of Labor Feb. 22, 2005).
79. Id. at *1.
80. Id. at *15. This was just one alternative holding in the case; the ALJ also concluded that
the complainant's former employer did not qualify as a covered employer under SOX. Id. at *14.
81. Id.at*17.
82. See id. (ending the discussion by reiterating that the former employer, a privately held
company, is not covered by Sarbanes-Oxley).
83. See Harvey v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-20, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 56, at *31,
*33, *37-38 (Dep't of Labor May 28, 2004); Harvey v. Safeway, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-21, 2005
DOLSOX LEXIS 4, at *76-77, *80 (Dep't of Labor Feb. 11,2005).
84. Livingston v. Wyeth Inc., No. 1:03CV00919, 2006 WL 2129794, at *10 (M.D.N.C. July
28, 2006).
85. Id. at *1.
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pharmaceutical vaccine products, including a GMP for training all
employees engaged in the drug manufacturing process.86 The Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") had detected various GMP violations in
two of the employer's facilities, and as a result the employer entered into
a consent decree with the FDA which required it to address compliance
issues in all of its facilities. 87 The facility in which the complainant
worked told the FDA that it would revise its quality system guidance
documents and set a target date of "September 30, 2002 implementing
the revisions and verifying compliance." 88 Even if the required training
curricula was not fully developed and implemented by this date,
however, the facility would be deemed compliant provided that a
satisfactory "legacy plan" was adopted. 89
The plaintiff, who was the team leader of the group set up to ensure
site-wide compliance with the GMP training system, alleges that he was
retaliated against for making repeated internal complaints about training
deficiencies and a perceived cover-up of those deficiencies. 90 The
plaintiff argued that he had a reasonably objective basis for believing
that if his office went forward with compliance verification as
scheduled, it would be providing false and misleading information to the
FDA, thereby subjecting it to fines and penalties. 91 The court disagreed,
and held that the plaintiff had not engaged in a protected activity. 92
First, the court found that there was not an actual violation of any of the
laws enumerated in section 806. 93 There was nothing in the record to
indicate that the employer "made false or misleading statements, or
omitted relevant information, in any documents provided to its
shareholders." 94
Next, the court explained why there was also no objectively
reasonable basis for the plaintiff to equate the perceived training
deficiencies with a violation. 95 The court stated that it was "entirely
speculative to say that because Defendants disagreed with Livingston's
belief that the facility could not meet the September 30, 2002 deadline,

86. Id.
87. Id. at *2.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *3 (explaining that a legacy plan is simply a way to close compliance gaps after the
compliance date passes).
90. Id. at *2, *5-6, *9.
91. Id. at *9.
92. Id. at *10.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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this meant that management planned to conceal critical information." 96
The complainant admitted that "even if compliance concerns persisted
on that date, a legacy plan could be created for purposes of avoiding
penalties," and the court found that this "concession [was] fatal" to his
SOX claim because no reasonable employee knowing that fact could
believe the employer was intending to conceal training deficiencies. 97
While the complainant contended that the potential financial impact
of non-compliance would be significant and thus the concerns about the
98
state of the training program should be reported, the court disagreed.
The court explained that:
Information must be sufficiently material to a company's financial
picture before it will form the basis for securities fraud.

Under

Supreme Court authority, for information to be material, there must be
"a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider
[the matter] important to his decision to invest." Given the importance
of "materiality" under the securities laws, Administrative Law Judges
have rejected whistleblower retaliation claims where the information
99
disclosed would not be sufficiently material to shareholders.
The court found that even if it were reasonable for the complainant
to believe that the FDA might take some type of enforcement action
because of compliance issues in the future, it would not necessarily
follow that the employer would be obligated to report the alleged
violations before the FDA actually took any action. 100 This is
presumably because at such a premature and speculative time, such
information would not be material to a reasonable investor.
Interestingly, the Livingston court does not discuss the
complainant's allegations that the potential fines and penalties would be
quite substantial.
This article proposes that this is because the
materiality requirement of the reasonable-belief standard has two
elements: (1) the likelihood that the negative event affecting the
financial reporting will actually materialize within a reasonable
timeframe, and (2) the potential financial impact that would result if and
when that event occurred. If we view these two elements as a sliding
scale-the stronger the likelihood that the event will occur, the less
financial impact will be required, and vice versa-then we will have a

96.

Id. at *10-11.

97.
98.

Id. at *10.
Id.

99.

Id. (citations omitted).

100. Id.
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109

useful test for predicting whether or not an employee's communications
regarding a perceived violation would be deemed a protected activity.
This strategy proves helpful in explaining the outcomes that have
101 the complainant
been reached to date. In Smith v. Hewlett Packard,
argued that he was retaliated against for reporting to the EEOC that his
employer failed to make appreciable efforts to remedy alleged race
discrimination.1 2
in analyzing whether this report constituted a
protected activity, the AU looked to the Home Depot case for guidance
and ultimately concluded that it did not. °3 The ALJ reiterated the
proposition announced in Home Depot that reporting an employer's
failure to disclose a class-action lawsuit based on systemic racial
discrimination with the potential to sufficiently affect the financial
condition of a corporation would likely constitute a protected activity,
but such was not the case before him. 1°4 The AU held that although
there was a vague rumor of a class-action lawsuit, there was no such
litigation and thus there was nothing material for the employer to
disclose to its shareholders. 10 5 Viewing this outcome on the sliding
scale, we see that although the financial effect of a class action based on
systematic race discrimination would undoubtedly have a significant
negative financial effect, the likelihood in Smith that such event would
actually occur anytime in the near future was too low for the situation to
be deemed material. Similarly, in Reed v. MCI, Inc., 106 the complainant
alleged that he was terminated because he reported the misuse of
unlicensed computer software.10 7 The complainant argued that this was
a protected activity because there could be substantial fines and loss of
goodwill associated with such use, thus negatively impacting the
financial health of the company. 108 The complainant noted that the
penalty per incident could be as high as $150,000 and that thousands of
incidents could have occurred.10 9 Nonetheless, the AU held that the
complainant could not reasonably believe that the company had
committed a violation of any of the enumerated security laws or that it

101. Smith v. Hewlett Packard, No. 2005-SOX-00088, 2006 WL 468045 (Dep't of Labor Jan.
19,2006).
102. Id. at *2.
103. Id. at *7, *9.
104. Id. at *7-8 (citing Harvey v. Home Depot, Inc., 2004-SOX-20, 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 56,
at *14-15 (Dep't of Labor May 28, 2004)).
105. Id.
106. No. 2006-SOX-00071, 2006 DOLSOX LEXIS 74 (Dep't of Labor June 20, 2006).
107. Id. at *6.
108. Id. at *7.
109. Id.
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had committed a fraud on its shareholders.' 10 Arguably, the ALJ came
to this result because even though the financial impact to the company
would be very significant, there was no evidence that any fines were
actually on the horizon.
IV. CONCLUSION

While the boundaries of what constitutes a protected activity under
SOX are still being drawn, the recent decisions outlined above give
practitioners guidance for future situations. The materiality requirement
for claims involving alleged shareholder fraud, as opposed to those
involving an alleged violation of one of the specifically enumerated
statutes or regulations, places an effective limitation on a law that could
otherwise be construed to protect virtually all conduct that might
eventually have some effect on shareholder reports, no matter how
remote the chances. Understanding what will be deemed material, and
thus what can form the basis for a reasonable belief that a fraud on
shareholders has occurred or is being attempted, is necessary in order to
discern the scope of protected activity. Fortunately, Livingston and other
recent cases are starting to give us direction in that regard, and future
cases will certainly continue to elaborate on the standard.

110.

Id. at "7-8.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol24/iss1/5

16

